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*The Missile Next Door: The Minuteman in the American Heartland* by Gretchen Heefner (review)

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(Review)

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the road of life, and it was not fully organized until late January 1942. The failure of efforts to break the blockade in 1941 and 1942 affected morale.

The authors offer a detailed examination of the local officials within the Communist Party, government, and security services charged with running the besieged city. Aleksei Kuznetsov, the Second Secretary of the Leningrad party organization, was a competent official facing impossible tasks. From the trials of the blockade, Kuznetsov emerged with a vision for the revival of Peter the Great's city as a window on the outside world. That was not to be. He was executed during the "Leningrad affair" in 1950.

The other side of the control apparatus in Leningrad was the NKVD and the NKGB, which handled internal affairs and state security respectively. These men were the sword and shield of the revolution who fought the battle against counterrevolutionary agitation, subversion, and sabotage, relying on a network of informants. The "competent organs" provided to party and state officials periodic assessments of public attitudes, with special attention to signs of discontent. There was no shortage of discontent. But their archives provide evidence of mishandled investigations reminiscent of Captain Louis Renault's "arrest the usual suspects" in *Casablanca*. The security services began the war still arresting Trotskyites but then found echoes of the Platonov and Tukhachevskii affairs to explain conspiracies among academicians and professors who were supposedly scheming to turn Leningrad over to the Germans. The historian Evgeny Tarle, who had been arrested during the Platonov affair, was presented as the candidate for foreign minister in a pro-German government following the defeat of the USSR, the same position Tarle supposedly would have received in the case of the Platonov affair in 1930. It did not matter that Tarle was the author of popular patriotic works, and as a Jew not likely to be an agent of Nazi Germany. On at least one occasion, Petr Kubatkin, the head of the Leningrad NKVD, quashed an investigation involving a *stukach* (informer) who was guilty of acting as an agent provocateur to promote his own interests, dropping the matter of the "activists" or "starving professors."

This book makes an important contribution to our understanding of the siege of Leningrad and the operation of the Soviet system in times of crisis.



Gretchen Heefner, *The Missile Next Door: The Minuteman in the American Heartland*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012. 294 pp.

*Reviewed by Kevin Jon Fernlund, University of Missouri, St. Louis*

Gretchen Heefner asks a good question: why did ordinary citizens in the American West agree to cede portions of their own land to the U.S. government, knowing their property would be used indefinitely as launch sites for Minuteman intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The first of these nuclear-armed ICBMs were deployed on 22 October 1962. By 1967, 1,000 had been positioned and aimed at the Soviet

Union, which aimed its own missiles right back. Designed by the U.S. Air Force's Colonel Edward H. Hall and built by Boeing, the Minuteman had only one purpose: deterrence. The missile was quick to launch (in two minutes), ready 24 hours a day, and highly reliable, and it carried a 1.2-megaton warhead that could strike targets in the USSR within thirty minutes. The military placed these missiles in underground, hardened silos that were grouped in separate, widely dispersed, densely packed fields. The total area involved was enormous, covering the Great Plains states of Missouri, Nebraska, Colorado, South Dakota, North Dakota, Wyoming, and Montana. A Soviet knockout blow was therefore all but impossible; and a U.S. counterstrike was a near certainty. The first ten missiles became operational at the height of the Cuban missile crisis, providing President John F. Kennedy with what he called his "ace in the hole" (p. 123).

But back to Heefner's question. According to the principle of Occam's razor, one should select the explanation with the fewest assumptions because it is the one most likely to be correct. Initially, Heefner seems to do just that. In the immediate post-*Sputnik* era, fears of a Soviet nuclear attack against the United States were high, on the Great Plains as well as elsewhere in the country, and the federal government responded to this general panic by developing the Minuteman ICBM. Ranchers acceded to the government's urgent requests to use their land out of a sense of duty, notwithstanding the risks and sacrifices. However, these men made clear that they wanted to be fairly compensated for their losses. They also wanted to know why the federal government turned to them in this crisis, when there was plenty of land available in the public domain, much of it in the American West and far from major population centers. Heefner speculates that the reason was the government's own dysfunction. "Apparently acquiring land from other government agencies," she writes, "was often more time-consuming than acquiring it from private individuals" (p. 95). Apparently, the threat of imminent nuclear annihilation was not enough to motivate these bureaucrats to cut through their own red tape.

By not stopping there and making more of this remarkable point, Heefner let a great book slip through her hands. The Greeks may have had their 300 but the Americans had the 1,000: the number, more or less, of ranchers who, despite their inept government, gave up land to defend their country in its hour of greatest need. This time it was cowboys, instead of Spartans, who saved Western civilization. Heefner, however, has a very different story in mind. Her heroes are not square-jawed, sunburned patriots but the protesters who emerged in the 1980s to stand up to the U.S. military-industrial complex—the real villain of the piece, not the Soviet Union, which she keeps largely in the background, except as an abstract threat or as an object of the war games played by the "the 'thermonuclear Jesuits' at the Rand Corporation" (p. 11). Heefner recounts the stories of several protesters, including Samuel H. Day, Jr. One morning in 1988, Day dressed up as a clown and used a bolt cutter to slice through the security fence at Missouri's Minuteman missile site K-8 (p. 138). The clown and another dozen or so protesters (it is not clear whether they, too, were dressed up as clowns) were aided by, she claims, "countless others" (p. 139). Heefner acknowledges

that these anti-nuclear protestors failed to get “rid of the Minuteman.” Nonetheless, she insists, unconvincingly, that their very existence undermines “the standard story of conservative ascendancy in the rural West” (p. 140).

Throughout the book, Heefner refers to the evils of the military-industrial complex. The Minuteman, which she sees as a case in point, succeeded because nefarious political, business, and military elites were willing to “sell deterrence” to the American people by playing on their fears and taking advantage of their naïve patriotism (p. 30–48). It was simply a fact, Heefner asserts, that no “respectable congressman could avoid hungering for the crumbs of military installations, no matter what doomsday scenario they represented” (p. 65). And once these installations were in place, they stayed in place, because the defense dollars they brought into the local economy created a region of addicts for Pentagon funds (pp. 9–10). The key was to find the path of least popular resistance.

According to Heefner, “a whiff of defense dollars could entice the needy, [but] it could also alert the opposition” (p. 72). In wealthier—and evidently smarter—New England, for instance, resistance to the Minuteman emerged immediately because the peace activists there were “under no illusions about what nuclear deterrence . . . would mean” in the event of a nuclear war (p. 73). The poor, benighted West, on the other hand, was a far more willing and compliant partner. That is really why, Heefner contends, the region’s citizens ended up with a missile next door.

The opposite of Occam’s razor is Occam’s beard—a thick, matted explanation, tangled up with dubious assumptions. Heefner’s short, well-written book is a significant addition to our knowledge of the Cold War West, in general, and of the Minuteman missile, in particular. But it desperately needs a good shave.



Hugo Service, *Germans to Poles: Communism, Nationalism, and Ethnic Cleansing after the Second World War*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. ix + 378 pp. \$99.00.

*Reviewed by R. M. Douglas, Colgate University*

The expulsion of the German population of central and southeast Europe during the five years after the Second World War is at last beginning to attract the attention it deserves from anglophone scholars. Much work, however, remains to be done. Although more than a quarter of a century has elapsed since the opening of many of the relevant state archives in the principal expelling countries (Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary), it is hard to think of any episode of comparable importance in respect of which English-speaking historians of modern Europe have displayed such a striking incuriosity. This is all the more remarkable inasmuch as so many aspects of the expulsions remain to be fully explicated. In particular, delineating the logistical elements of what proved to be a massive multinational operation, accomplished at