The Effects of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984: The Case of Seasoned Equity Offerings

Thomas H. Eyssell, James P. Reburn

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Previous empirical research indicates that corporate insiders tend to increase (decrease) their shareholdings before events that increase (decrease) firm value. More recent evidence suggests, however, that passage of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA) may have deterred this behavior. Our results indicate that before passage of the ITSA, insiders exploited their access to nonpublic information by selling shares before the announcement of equity issues. However, after passage of the ITSA insiders no longer displayed this behavior. We conclude the ITSA has a deterrent effect, which is more heavily concentrated on insiders at the highest level of the firm who are most visible to regulators and other market participants.
Original languageAmerican English
JournalJournal of Financial Research
Volume16
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1 1993

Disciplines

  • Economics
  • Finance

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