Regulatory Deterrence and Registered Insider Trading: The Case of Tender Offers

Thomas H. Eyssell; Nasser Arshadi

doi:10.2307/3665727

Regulatory Deterrence and Registered Insider Trading: The Case of Tender Offers

University of Missouri-St. Louis

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Original language	American English
Journal	Financial Management
Volume	20
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.2307/3665727
State	Published - Jan 22 1991

Disciplines

Business
Economics
Finance

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title = "Regulatory Deterrence and Registered Insider Trading: The Case of Tender Offers",

author = "Eyssell, {Thomas H.} and Nasser Arshadi",

note = "Empirical studies of insider trading regulation suggest that regulators have been ineffective in deterring illegal insider trading in the 1960s and 1970s. This ...",

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doi = "10.2307/3665727",

language = "American English",

volume = "20",

journal = "Financial Management",

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AU - Eyssell, Thomas H.

AU - Arshadi, Nasser

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PY - 1991/1/22

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UR - https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:fma:fmanag:arshadi91

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JO - Financial Management

JF - Financial Management

ER -

Regulatory Deterrence and Registered Insider Trading: The Case of Tender Offers

Disciplines

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