Abstract
People do things for various reasons. Are these motivating reasons psychological? This question is the focus of this chapter. I argue here that such reasons are typically not purely psychological. Yet there is an important psychological element or aspect of these reasons. I proceed by first reviewing some arguments for and against psychologism about (motivating) reasons. Next, I do the same for the view that reasons are typically non-psychological facts. I then explore some additional alternatives: (a) disjunctivist views, (b) the appositional account, and finally (c) naïve action theory, which I favour. Naïve action theory transcends and preserves the best features of both standard psychologism and standard anti-psychologism.
| Original language | American English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jul 10 2018 |
Disciplines
- Philosophy
- Epistemology