Powerful Chief Executive Officers and Firm Performance: Integrating Agency and Stewardship Theory

Penghua Qiao; Anna Fung; Jianchun Miao; Hung-Gay Fung

doi:10.1111/cwe.12223

Powerful Chief Executive Officers and Firm Performance: Integrating Agency and Stewardship Theory

Penghua Qiao, Anna Fung, Jianchun Miao, Hung-Gay Fung

University of Missouri-St. Louis

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

<div class="line" id="line-19"> <span style='color: rgb(28, 29, 30); font-family: "Open Sans", icomoon, sans-serif; font-size: 16px;'> Do agency and stewardship behaviors coexist at firms, or does one dominate the other? We use data from listed companies in China over the period 2007–2016 to show that powerful chief executive officers (CEOs) simultaneously incur self&hyphen;interested agency costs while acting as stewards to benefit the firm. In balancing the push&hyphen;and&hyphen;pull forces of stewardship and agency behaviors, powerful CEOs in Chinese firms ultimately improve short&hyphen;term and long&hyphen;term firm performance. Our results have important implications for understanding how CEOs affect firms and how cultural factors can motivate CEOs to work in the interest of the firm. </span></div>

Original language	American English
Journal	China World Economy
Volume	25
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/cwe.12223
State	Published - Jan 11 2017

Disciplines

Economics
Public Relations and Advertising
Business

Access to Document

10.1111/cwe.12223License: Unspecified

Cite this

@article{35b01647d53345fea600dbb6b4692387,

title = "Powerful Chief Executive Officers and Firm Performance: Integrating Agency and Stewardship Theory",

abstract = " Do agency and stewardship behaviors coexist at firms, or does one dominate the other? We use data from listed companies in China over the period 2007–2016 to show that powerful chief executive officers (CEOs) simultaneously incur self&hyphen;interested agency costs while acting as stewards to benefit the firm. In balancing the push&hyphen;and&hyphen;pull forces of stewardship and agency behaviors, powerful CEOs in Chinese firms ultimately improve short&hyphen;term and long&hyphen;term firm performance. Our results have important implications for understanding how CEOs affect firms and how cultural factors can motivate CEOs to work in the interest of the firm. ",

author = "Penghua Qiao and Anna Fung and Jianchun Miao and Hung-Gay Fung",

note = "Enter your email address below. If your address has been previously registered, you will receive an email with instructions on how to reset your password. If you don't receive an email, you should register as a new user",

year = "2017",

month = jan,

day = "11",

doi = "10.1111/cwe.12223",

language = "American English",

volume = "25",

journal = "China World Economy",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Powerful Chief Executive Officers and Firm Performance: Integrating Agency and Stewardship Theory

AU - Qiao, Penghua

AU - Fung, Anna

AU - Miao, Jianchun

AU - Fung, Hung-Gay

N1 - Enter your email address below. If your address has been previously registered, you will receive an email with instructions on how to reset your password. If you don't receive an email, you should register as a new user

PY - 2017/1/11

Y1 - 2017/1/11

N2 - Do agency and stewardship behaviors coexist at firms, or does one dominate the other? We use data from listed companies in China over the period 2007–2016 to show that powerful chief executive officers (CEOs) simultaneously incur self&hyphen;interested agency costs while acting as stewards to benefit the firm. In balancing the push&hyphen;and&hyphen;pull forces of stewardship and agency behaviors, powerful CEOs in Chinese firms ultimately improve short&hyphen;term and long&hyphen;term firm performance. Our results have important implications for understanding how CEOs affect firms and how cultural factors can motivate CEOs to work in the interest of the firm.

AB - Do agency and stewardship behaviors coexist at firms, or does one dominate the other? We use data from listed companies in China over the period 2007–2016 to show that powerful chief executive officers (CEOs) simultaneously incur self&hyphen;interested agency costs while acting as stewards to benefit the firm. In balancing the push&hyphen;and&hyphen;pull forces of stewardship and agency behaviors, powerful CEOs in Chinese firms ultimately improve short&hyphen;term and long&hyphen;term firm performance. Our results have important implications for understanding how CEOs affect firms and how cultural factors can motivate CEOs to work in the interest of the firm.

UR - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/cwe.12223/full

UR - https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/cwe.12223

U2 - 10.1111/cwe.12223

DO - 10.1111/cwe.12223

M3 - Article

VL - 25

JO - China World Economy

JF - China World Economy

ER -

Powerful Chief Executive Officers and Firm Performance: Integrating Agency and Stewardship Theory

Abstract

Disciplines

Access to Document

Other files and links

Cite this