TY - JOUR
T1 - Peer Disagreement: Special Cases
AU - Wiland, Eric
N1 - When you discover that an epistemic peer disagrees with you about some matter, does rationality require you to alter your views? Concessivists answer in the affirmative, but their view faces a problem in special cases. As others have noted, if concessivism itself is what's under dispute, then concessivism seems to undermine itself.
PY - 2018/1/1
Y1 - 2018/1/1
N2 - When you discover that an epistemic peer disagrees with you about some matter, does rationality require you to alter your views? Concessivists answer in the affirmative, but their view faces a problem in special cases. As others have noted, if concessivism itself is what’s under dispute, then concessivism seems to undermine itself. But there are other unexplored special cases too. This article identifies three such special cases, and argues that concessivists in fact face no special problem.
AB - When you discover that an epistemic peer disagrees with you about some matter, does rationality require you to alter your views? Concessivists answer in the affirmative, but their view faces a problem in special cases. As others have noted, if concessivism itself is what’s under dispute, then concessivism seems to undermine itself. But there are other unexplored special cases too. This article identifies three such special cases, and argues that concessivists in fact face no special problem.
UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20189217
U2 - 10.5840/logos-episteme20189217
DO - 10.5840/logos-episteme20189217
M3 - Article
VL - 9
JO - Logos and Episteme
JF - Logos and Episteme
ER -