Functionalism, Computationalism, and Mental States

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Some philosophers have conflated functionalism and computationalism. I reconstruct how this came about and uncover two assumptions that made the conflation possible. They are the assumptions that (i) psychological functional analyses are computational descriptions and (ii) everything may be described as performing computations. I argue that, if we want to improve our understanding of both the metaphysics of mental states and the functional relations between them, we should reject these assumptions.
Original languageAmerican English
JournalStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A
Volume35
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2004

Keywords

  • Computational Functionalism
  • Computational Theory of Mind
  • Computationalism
  • Functional Analysis
  • Functionalism
  • Mental States

Disciplines

  • Philosophy

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