Epistemological motivations for anti-realism

William Dunaway

doi:10.1007/S11098-017-0981-7

Epistemological motivations for anti-realism

University of Missouri-St. Louis

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Original language	American English
Journal	Philosophical Studies
Volume	175
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/S11098-017-0981-7
State	Published - 2018

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Philosophy

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title = "Epistemological motivations for anti-realism",

author = "William Dunaway",

note = "Anti-realism is often claimed to be preferable to realism on epistemological grounds: while realists have difficulty explaining how we can ever know claims if we are realists about it, anti-realism faces no analogous problem. This paper focuses on anti-realism about normativity to investigate this alleged advantage to anti-realism in detail.",

year = "2018",

doi = "10.1007/S11098-017-0981-7",

language = "American English",

volume = "175",

journal = "Philosophical Studies",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Epistemological motivations for anti-realism

AU - Dunaway, William

N1 - Anti-realism is often claimed to be preferable to realism on epistemological grounds: while realists have difficulty explaining how we can ever know claims if we are realists about it, anti-realism faces no analogous problem. This paper focuses on anti-realism about normativity to investigate this alleged advantage to anti-realism in detail.

PY - 2018

Y1 - 2018

UR - https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-017-0981-7

U2 - 10.1007/S11098-017-0981-7

DO - 10.1007/S11098-017-0981-7

M3 - Article

VL - 175

JO - Philosophical Studies

JF - Philosophical Studies

ER -

Epistemological motivations for anti-realism

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