Do Virtue Ethicists Parent Poorly? The Threat of Developmental Psychology for Moral Education and Responsibility in Virtue Ethics

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Abstract

In this paper, I argue that virtue ethics is unfortunately committed to a developmentally detrimental form of moral evaluation in its traditional iterations. That is, first, because both action guidance and moral development are central to virtue ethic and, second, because virtue ethics permits or requires character appraisal in moral education and child-rearing through praise and blame. However, studies from developmental and clinical psychology show that praise or blame involving character appraisal can be detrimental to children and, especially, to women and girls. While not all empirical studies point in this direction, the data are sufficiently murky to warrant an objection to virtue ethics along the lines of a situationism. Using a feminist and care-oriented critique, I argue this could pose a problem for virtue ethics. However, I argue that the criterion of moral evaluation can and must be distinguished from successful moral education of children to avoid this problem. By focusing on behavior instead of character, moral agents can avoid the harm virtue ethics may cause. Finally, I respond to an objection that doing so makes virtue ethics esoteric or self-effacing and argue that it fares no worse than other moral theories.
Original languageAmerican English
JournalFeminist Philosophy Quarterly
Volume10
StatePublished - May 30 2024

Keywords

  • Aristotle
  • action guidance
  • child-rearing
  • criterion of morality
  • moral development
  • moral psychology
  • sexism
  • situationism

Disciplines

  • Feminist, Gender, and Sexuality Studies
  • Women's Studies
  • Philosophy
  • Ethics and Political Philosophy
  • Feminist Philosophy
  • Applied Ethics

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