Directorate interlocks and corporate cash holdings in emerging economies: Evidence from China

Xiaoqing Li; Anna Fung; Hung-Gay Fung; Penghao Qiao

doi:10.1016/J.IREF.2019.12.002

Directorate interlocks and corporate cash holdings in emerging economies: Evidence from China

Xiaoqing Li
, Anna Fung
, Hung-Gay Fung
, Penghao Qiao

University of Missouri-St. Louis

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Original language	American English
Journal	International Review of Economics & Finance
Volume	66
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/J.IREF.2019.12.002
State	Published - Mar 1 2020

Disciplines

Economics
Finance

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Cite this

@article{c6949b87e7e84b04985ad7f1350e4f98,

title = "Directorate interlocks and corporate cash holdings in emerging economies: Evidence from China",

author = "Xiaoqing Li and Anna Fung and Hung-Gay Fung and Penghao Qiao",

note = "The large amount of cash that some corporations hold has recently come under public scrutiny. Prior research has used the agency cost framework to explain why managers prefer large corporate cash holdings. Using a novel and intuitive approach, the resource-dependence perspective, we document that directorate interlocks, in terms of network centrality and structural holes that enable firms to have access to resources, affects firms' cash holdings.",

year = "2020",

month = mar,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1016/J.IREF.2019.12.002",

language = "American English",

volume = "66",

journal = "International Review of Economics \& Finance",

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TY - JOUR

T1 - Directorate interlocks and corporate cash holdings in emerging economies: Evidence from China

AU - Li, Xiaoqing

AU - Fung, Anna

AU - Fung, Hung-Gay

AU - Qiao, Penghao

N1 - The large amount of cash that some corporations hold has recently come under public scrutiny. Prior research has used the agency cost framework to explain why managers prefer large corporate cash holdings. Using a novel and intuitive approach, the resource-dependence perspective, we document that directorate interlocks, in terms of network centrality and structural holes that enable firms to have access to resources, affects firms' cash holdings.

PY - 2020/3/1

Y1 - 2020/3/1

UR - https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1059056019308032

U2 - 10.1016/J.IREF.2019.12.002

DO - 10.1016/J.IREF.2019.12.002

M3 - Article

VL - 66

JO - International Review of Economics & Finance

JF - International Review of Economics & Finance

ER -

Directorate interlocks and corporate cash holdings in emerging economies: Evidence from China

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