TY - JOUR
T1 - Capital Mobility and Trade Policy: The Case of the Canada-US Auto Pact
AU - Thomas, Kenneth P.
N1 - Capital mobility is a central determinant of trade policy. Increasing capital mobility creates pressures for trade liberalization, which in itself represents a further increase in capital mobility. Not only does increasing capital mobility orient firm preferences to reducing barriers to trade and strengthen firms relative to other actors in society, it raises the costs to governments of protection, in terms of employment, consumer prices, production and balance of payments effects.
PY - 1997
Y1 - 1997
N2 - Capital mobility is a central determinant of trade policy. Increasing capital mobility creates pressures for trade liberalization, which in itself represents a further increase in capital mobility. Not only does increasing capital mobility orient firm preferences to reducing barriers to trade and strengthen firms relative to other actors in society, it raises the costs to governments of protection, in terms of employment, consumer prices, production and balance of payments effects. Governments can accept these costs, which is why trade liberalization is not automatic, but it is likely that governments will eventually liberalize, as did Canada in the case examined here. This article thus seeks to extend recent work on the trade preferences of multinational corporations by demonstrating the independent yet complementary effects of capital mobility on firm and government preferences.
AB - Capital mobility is a central determinant of trade policy. Increasing capital mobility creates pressures for trade liberalization, which in itself represents a further increase in capital mobility. Not only does increasing capital mobility orient firm preferences to reducing barriers to trade and strengthen firms relative to other actors in society, it raises the costs to governments of protection, in terms of employment, consumer prices, production and balance of payments effects. Governments can accept these costs, which is why trade liberalization is not automatic, but it is likely that governments will eventually liberalize, as did Canada in the case examined here. This article thus seeks to extend recent work on the trade preferences of multinational corporations by demonstrating the independent yet complementary effects of capital mobility on firm and government preferences.
UR - https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/096922997347878
U2 - 10.1080/096922997347878
DO - 10.1080/096922997347878
M3 - Article
VL - 4
JO - Review of International Political Economy
JF - Review of International Political Economy
ER -