A Policy Agenda for the Twenty-first Century: Transparency and Beyond

Kenneth P. Thomas

doi:10.1057/9780230302396_9

A Policy Agenda for the Twenty-first Century: Transparency and Beyond

Kenneth P. Thomas

University of Missouri-St. Louis

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter

Abstract

Competition for investment using investment incentives is a genuine strategic interaction, not a figment of policymakers’ imagination. Whether analyzed with Prisoners’ Dilemma or more complex games, the studies have found that optimal regulation of incentives improves overall efficiency and welfare. The European Union has shown what the broad parameters of ‘optimal’ regulation look like: banning investment incentives in rich regions, and holding them as low as possible in poorer regions. With rules that explicitly address incentives (rather than all subsidies) in place since 1997, the EU has managed to effect a reduction in the size of location subsidy packages, as we saw in Chapter 6.

Original language	American English
Title of host publication	Investment Incentives and the Global Competition for Capital
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230302396_9
State	Published - Jan 1 2011

Disciplines

Public Administration
Economic Policy
Political Science

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A Policy Agenda for the Twenty-first Century: Transparency and Beyond

Abstract

Disciplines

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